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Abstract
The importance of manufactures trade to the developing countries has increased
dramatically since the early 1980s, and developing countries’ reliance on each
others as markets has also risen sharply. Developing countries face
disproportionately high trade barriers in manufactures and barriers to their
manufactures exports account for around 70 percent of the total barriers faced by
their exports. The inclusion of manufactures trade in the WTO 2000 negotiations
is particularly important for developing countries, who would benefit both from
improved market access and through greater domestic efficiency. In fact,
developing countries capture a majority of the benefits (75%) of manufacturing
liberalization. In contrast, comparable cuts in agriculture and services benefit the
high-income countries relatively more since only one-quarter and one-third,
respectively, of the global benefits accrue to developing countries in these two
cases.
I. Introduction
A novel feature of preparations for the WTO 2000 negotiations is the presence of
a built-in agenda. This agenda includes agriculture and services trade—the two major
areas where a framework for liberalization was developed during the Uruguay Round,
and the process of liberalization commenced. It does not include trade in manufactures—
the trade that was central to all previous rounds of negotiations. A key question in this
context is whether the agenda should be broadened to include manufactures trade.
It has been traditional to assume that liberalization of manufactures trade is in the
interest of developed countries, and that developing country interests lie predominantly
with primary commodities. However, this simple dichotomy is now seriously in question
given the relocation of manufacturing industries, particularly those relying heavily on
unskilled labor, to developing countries during the past twenty-five years. As a
consequence, developing countries have become much more interested in liberalization
of trade in manufactures than was previously the case1.
Given the dynamics of GATT negotiations, it is probably necessary that there be
reciprocal market access gains if liberalization of tariffs on manufactures is to be
endorsed by the full WTO membership. This effectively adds a mercantilist constraint to
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 See, for example, the case for reciprocal liberalization in manufactures trade offered by the South Centre
(1998, Section 14.2).
2the economist’s usual economic efficiency criterion that liberalization should be welfare-
enhancing. Whether trade in manufactures meets this criterion will depend heavily upon
the pattern of exports, and the pattern of protection in developing countries’ export
markets. While these same considerations are potentially also important from the
viewpoint of economic efficiency, it is likely that these gains will be more heavily
dependent upon the extent to which countries liberalize their own imports (Martin and
Winters 1996, Ch 1; Bach, Lloyd, and Martin 1995).
In the next section of this paper, we consider the patterns of trade and protection,
as well as other structural features of the global manufacturing economy that are likely to
influence the welfare impacts of liberalizing manufactures trade. We then turn to
projections of the global economy to the year 2005 when the Uruguay Round (UR)
implementation is complete. Our goal is to assess the potential impact of further cuts
from this post-UR base. Then, in the fourth section, we discuss the simulations performed
and the key findings. The fifth section contains a summary and conclusions.
II. Patterns of trade and protection
In this section, we briefly review some of the broad features of global production,
consumption, trade and protection that bear upon whether manufactures should be
included in the WTO 2000 negotiations. We consider first the importance of
manufactures2 in the exports of developed and developing countries. Then, we consider
the broad structure of protection in each group of countries.
Some very broad statistics on the composition of developing country exports are
given in Figure 1. (For a listing of the countries included in the developing country
aggregate, see appendix Table A1. Appendix Table A3 gives sectoral definitions.) This
figure shows that manufactures made up only around a quarter of developing country
merchandise exports in 1965, and that this share had increased to just over thirty percent
by 1981, when preparations for the Uruguay Round were getting under way. Since then,
however, the value-based share of manufactures in developing country exports has
increased dramatically. By 1994, manufactures exports accounted for almost three-
quarters of developing country exports. The share of mineral exports increased from
around 30 percent in 1965 to around half of total exports in the 1974-81 period in
response to the oil shock and related commodity prices, but then declined to around 15
percent by 1995. The share of agricultural exports declined more or less continuously to
just over 10 percent in 1995. Given the subdued outlook for commodity exports (World
Bank 1999), it seems likely that the overall importance of manufactures exports will
increase further during the course of the WTO 2000 negotiations. This is confirmed by
the 1996-2005 projections shown in Figure 1, which show the share of manufactures
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 The definition of manufactures used follows as closely as possible the definition utilized in the WTO.
Thus, agriculture includes the raw and processed agricultural products defined by the WTO agreement on
agriculture (WTO 1995, p56)
3rising to close to 80 percent. (The origin of these projections will be discussed in section
three below.)
The change in the structure of merchandise exports has potentially important
implications for the developing countries in the negotiations. In the lead up to the
Uruguay Round, it might have seemed reasonable for developing countries interested
primarily in mercantilist export expansion to focus on improving the market access
opportunities for their traditional commodity exports. By now, it is clear from the chart
that this situation had changed dramatically at least for the “average” developing country.
With such a large share of manufactures in their merchandise exports, it seems likely that
the export gains for developing countries, taken as a group, will depend significantly
upon the extent of liberalization in these products.
Despite this strong increase in the share of manufactures in total merchandise
exports, the aggregated trade balance for the developing countries, vis à vis the high
income countries, continues to show a deficit in manufactures.  This is offset by a trade
surplus in primary products (Table 1). Mercantilist logic might lead one to conclude that
trade liberalization in manufactures is more likely to benefit the wealthy countries.
However, as we shall see, this view is misguided, and ignores the cost of high levels of
current protection to developing countries themselves.
The direction of exports of manufactures is likely to be important when
developing countries are evaluating offers made in a multilateral context. For
manufactures trade, Table 2 shows that developing countries are relatively more
important destinations for manufactured exports from developing countries than they are
for the industrial countries. Almost 40 percent of developing country exports of
manufactures (39.6% from Table 2) were destined for other developing economies in
1995.
The share of developing country manufactures exports going to other developing
countries has been increasing steadily over time, as is evident from Figure 2. (Definitions
for each of the regions in this and subsequent figures may be found in Appendix Table
A2.) The projected importance of developing country markets is expected to continue
increasing over time, approaching 45% of developing country exports by the year 2005.
Some part of this intra-developing country trade involves trade in components3 and may
be liable for lower duty rates in the importing economies, particularly if the components
are used in the production of exports. However, another important stimulus to the growth
in intra-developing country trade in manufactures has undoubtedly been the reductions in
developing country rates of protection during the last two decades (Srinivasan, Whalley
and Wooton 1993).
The potential effects of liberalization in particular sectors are also heavily
influenced by the height of the initial tariff barriers. With more than one sector subject to
distortions, it is necessary to consider the distortions in all sectors if the full effects of
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 Yeats (1998) estimates that 30 percent of world trade in manufactures is in parts and components.
4liberalization are to be understood. Estimates of the MFN applied rates of protection
applying to three major categories of merchandise trade identified in the GTAP model are
therefore presented in Table 3. These estimates are taken from the GTAP Version 4
database, which draws on the UNCTAD TRAINS data collection effort for tariffs, and
estimates of protection to agriculture originally calculated by Ingco (1996). The patterns
of protection are broadly consistent with those presented by Laird (1999) and by Abreu
(1996).
From the first panel of Table 3, it is clear that, at 3.4 percent, the trade-weighted,
aggregate MFN applied tariffs facing developing country exports of manufactures to high
income countries are almost four times higher than the same tariffs facing industrial
country exporters to the same markets. This is entirely due to the composition of trade,
with higher tariffs being levied on products imported from developing countries.
Developing country importers do not discriminate against other developing countries to
the same extent, with the average tariff of 12.8 percent against developing countries only
around one-sixth above the 10.9 percent applied to exports from industrial countries.
However, the average tariff rates to developing country tariffs on imports from other
developing countries are still more than two and a half-times as high as the high income
country tariffs applied to developing countries (12.8% vs. 3.4%).
Estimates of the trade-weighted, average tariff rates applying to agricultural
products are presented in the second panel of Table 3.4 From these data, it appears that
average agricultural tariffs in the industrial countries are around ten times as high as those
applied in manufactures. Interestingly, there is very little difference between the rates
applied against imports from developing and from high income countries. In developing
countries, average agricultural tariffs are also higher than those on imports of
manufactures, but the difference is much smaller, with the average agricultural tariff less
than twice that prevailing on manufactures.
The estimates of tariffs on mineral and energy products presented in the bottom
panel of Table 3 suggest that trade barriers on these goods are generally relatively low.
The only case where these tariffs exceed five percent is on imports by developing
countries from other developing countries.
One way to obtain an extremely crude indication of the importance of particular
trade flows is to examine the product of the tariff rate and the value of the trade flows, or
the implied tariff revenues associated with particular trade barriers. Table 4 presents
estimates of the financial implications of these tariffs in the same format as Table 3. The
estimates in Table 4 highlight the importance of the remaining barriers to industrial trade
in manufactures to both developing and developed countries. For the world as a whole,
manufactures tariffs amounted to almost $189 billion. Roughly 40 percent of the total
tariff impost on manufactures, or $80 billion, was levied on manufactures exports from
developing countries.  Interestingly, $57 billion, or just over 70 percent, of this burden
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 Given the continued difficulties in obtaining reliable ad valorem tariff rates for agriculture, in many
cases, these tariffs have been estimated using price comparison data (McDougall et al., 1999, chp. 13).
5was imposed by developing countries themselves. The global tariff imposts on
agricultural exports, at $87 billion, were also substantial, with developing country exports
facing just over a third of this impost. The total tariff burden on developing country
exports was $115 billion, or 40 percent of the global total—almost double their 22%
share in global GDP.
The relatively high level of tariffs in developing countries has influenced the cost
structure of their manufacturing sectors. Table 5 reports the estimated 1995 share of
industrial firms’ expenditures on labor, capital, agriculture, minerals, manufacturing and
services inputs in the developing and high income regions. Note that developing
countries spend more on intermediates, per $ of output, while they spend less on labor.
This difference in cost structure reflects the relatively lower wages (and emphasis on
unskilled labor) in lower income countries, as well as the relatively higher tariffs on
imported manufactures. We can also we break out the share of total costs devoted to
intermediate imports. These are reported in the parenthetic terms of Table 5. From this
we see that imported manufactures account for 14.4 percent of total manufacturing costs
in the developing countries, versus only 9 percent in the high income region.
We can break out consumer expenditure in a similar way. These budget shares
(measured at producer prices) are reported in Table 6. From this table, it is clear that
manufactures are also relatively more important in the final consumption bundle of
developing countries (24 percent vs. 17 percent in the high income countries). Despite
this heavier reliance on manufactures in both production and consumption, the
manufacturing sector’s share in aggregate developing country GDP is about the same as
that in the high income region (21.5 percent). This is consistent with the observed
manufactures trade deficit for developing countries, reported in Table 1.
Of course, these averages mask considerable variation across individual
economies. Figures 3-5 display the shares of manufactures in GDP, the share of this
production which is exported, and the share of manufactures in total merchandise exports
for the 19 countries and regions which we highlight in this paper. (The country/region
abbreviations used in these figures are detailed in Table A2.) It is clear from the diversity
in both the developing and high income regions, that endowments and country size are
more important determinants of these GDP and trade shares than is the country’s income
level. Focusing on the high income countries in Figure 3, we see that Japan shows a
relatively high share of manufacturing in GDP, whereas this share for the natural
resource-abundant Australia/New Zealand region is quite low. The export orientation of
manufacturing (Figure 4) is relatively low for the largest high income economies (North
America, Japan), and larger for the smaller, highly integrated, high income economies of
Western Europe. Developing countries’ GDP shares of manufactures range from a high
of 28% in Taiwan, to a low of less than 10% in Sub-Saharan Africa. The export
orientation of manufacturing activity ranges from very low in the case of Brazil, to very
important in the case of the East Asian economies.
These differences in GDP and export shares are also reflected in the observed
variation in the share of manufacturing in total merchandise exports. Figure 5 reports this
6share for the 19 individual countries and regions. From this figure, it is clear that a large
number of the economies that would be likely to elect for developing country status in the
WTO rely very heavily on manufactures trade. Of these, Korea, Hong Kong and
Singapore (Other NICs), Taiwan (China), and China all have manufactures shares that are
above 80 percent, and above that of the Western Europe and North America. At the other
extreme, in only one of the 19 countries/regions identified in the chart was the share of
manufactured exports less than a quarter. This group is the Sub-Saharan African
countries outside the Southern African Customs Union, where manufactures accounted
for only 19 percent of total merchandise exports.
The database underpinning the proceeding figures is the version 4.0 GTAP
database (McDougall, et al., 1998). We have aggregated this up from the 45 region - 50
sector level at which it is maintained, in order to facilitate our analysis. It represents a
snapshot of the world economy in 1995, which is the first year of implementation for the
Uruguay Round (UR) agreement. For our analysis of the potential gains from
manufacturing liberalization in the next WTO round, we need to look ahead to 2005,
when the UR agreement is due to be fully implemented. Of course, there will be many
other changes to the world economy between 1995 and 2005 and we therefore employ a
formal projections approach to establish a 2005 starting point for our WTO2000 analysis.
III. Projections to 2005
Overall rates of economic growth: We employ the widely used GTAP model of
global trade (Hertel, 1997).5 This is a relatively standard, multi-region, applied general
equilibrium model which features explicit modeling of international transport margins, a
global “bank” designed to mediate between world savings and investment, and a
relatively sophisticated consumer demand system designed to capture differential price
and income responsiveness across countries.  The latter is particularly important in the
case of projections work. Throughout the paper we employ the simplistic, but robust
assumption of perfect competition and constant returns to scale in production activities. 6
Validation efforts with this model (Gehlhar, 1997; Coyle et al., 1998) show that it is able
to track, to a reasonable degree, some of the major changes in trade patterns over the past
two decades.7
Following earlier projections work with the GTAP model (Gehlhar et al., 1994;
Anderson et al.; Arndt et al.), we assemble external projections for population, skilled
and unskilled labor, investment and capital stock. When combined with assumptions
about likely productivity growth rates, this permits us to predict the level and
composition of GDP in 2005, as well as trade flows, input usage, and a wide range of
                                                
5
 The model is implemented using GEMPACK, (Harrison and Pearson, 1996),
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 Alternative versions of the GTAP model feature imperfect competition (Francois, 1998), but these are
demanding of additional information and unstable for projections purposes.
7
 Gehlhar's work showed that projections over a period of one decade were improved by increasing the size
of the trade elasticities. Accordingly, for this work, we have doubled the size of the standard GTAP
trade elasticities.
7other variables. Our forecasts for these fundamental drivers of change over the 1995-
2005 period are reported in Table 7. These projections were generated by combining
historical and forecast data from the World Bank. Projections for population and
unskilled labor were obtained by cumulating the average growth rates between 1995 and
the projected 2005 data. The skilled labor projections, based on forecasts of the growth in
the stock of tertiary educated labor in each developing country (Ahuja and Filmer, 1995)
and projected  growth rates of skilled labor in developed countries from the World Bank,
provide an indication of changes in the stock of those qualified for employment as
professional and technical workers. Growth rates of physical capital were obtained from
1995 and the projected 2005 stock of physical capital. Projections of the stock of physical
capital were calculated using the Harberger-style, perpetual inventory method, that is, by
adding investment net of depreciation to update the capital stock in each year. Data for
initial physical capital stock for 1995 as well as annual forecasts of gross domestic
investment were obtained from the World Bank.
Our projections of total factor productivity (TFP) growth vary by sector and
region. Regions are grouped into four categories accordingly to their assumed rate of
annual productivity growth in manufactures. These range from low productivity growth
(0.33%/year), to medium (1%/year), and high (2%/year), with a final category -- very
high (3%) reserved for China and Taiwan, China. The latter two economies seem to be
growing at rates that can only be explained by taking into account factors such as the
demographic transition (Bloom and Williamson 1998), rapid intersectoral movements of
labor, and productivity-enhancing reforms. Sectoral variation in productivity growth
builds on the econometric work of Bernard and Jones (1996). They find that the annual
rate of productivity growth over the 1970-87 period in OECD agriculture was about 40%
faster than that of manufacturing8. Similarly, services TFP growth was about half that in
manufacturing, while they did not find significant productivity growth in mining over this
period. By combining these factors of proportion with the above-mentioned
manufacturing TFP growth rates, we are able to obtain region/sector-specific productivity
forecasts for the 1995-2005 period.
A difficult aspect of constructing such projections has to do with the rate at which
natural resources are depleted -- or perhaps augmented through new discoveries. Rather
than attempt to estimate changes in the natural resource endowments over this period, we
have simply opted to target a particular rate of change in the prices of natural resource-
based commodities over the projections period. Grilli and Yang (1988) report an average
rate of price decline for metals in the 20th century of about 0.8%/year, while grains prices
have fallen about 0.3%/year, on average. We allow the model to select a rate of natural
resource augmentation in agriculture and mining which achieves a continuation of these
downward trends in commodity prices throughout the 1995-2005 period.
In order to gauge the reasonableness of our projections, Figure 6 compares our
projected GDP growth rates over this period to those from the World Bank's International
Economic Analysis and Prospects Division. By and large they are quite close. This is
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 Martin and Mitra (1999) find evidence of an even larger differential of agricultural over manufacturing
productivity in developing countries.
8hardly surprising, since the two studies share many of the same basic assumptions.
Significant departures arise in the cases of the South Africa Customs Union, the
Economies in Transition (EIT) and Indonesia. In each case, our projected growth rates
are substantially higher than the World Bank's.  The only way the World Bank forecasts
for these three regions could be achieved in our framework is to have negative
productivity growth rates, or substantial increases in unemployment rates. We have opted
not to do either of these, and so our forecasts are higher. Our forecast for China's GDP
growth is slightly higher than that of the Bank, however, the difference is negligible when
viewed in terms of annual growth rates.
Changes in trade policy: From the point of view of this paper, the most important
trade policy developments over the 1995-2005 period are likely to be the completion of
manufacturing tariff cuts under the Uruguay Round, implementation of the Agreement on
Textiles and Clothing (ATC) and the accession of China and Taiwan, China to the WTO.
We have incorporated these changes by drawing on the work of Francois and Strutt
(1999) to specify the remaining UR cuts to be made from our 1995 base period. The
estimate of China's reforms in manufactures were made by beginning with its 1997
applied tariffs, and reducing them in those cases where its most recent multilateral tariff
offer would require reductions. The reduction in protection in Taiwan, China was brought
about by reducing all tariffs by the extent needed to reach the widely-reported target of 4
percent in manufactures.
Figure 7 reports the average MFN tariff on manufactures, by importer in 1995,
and 2005, where the latter is based on the lesser of individual countries' UR bindings and
their 1995 applied tariffs. For many regions, the 1995 and 2005 tariffs are very similar,
indicating that we do not anticipate significant manufacturing tariff reductions over the
course of our projections period. However, deep cuts are expected for South Asia, as can
be seen from the entries for India and OthSoAsia. Similarly, China's offer to the WTO
appears to involve substantial cuts in manufacturing protection from the tariffs in place as
of 1995.
The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing implements accelerated growth of
quotas established under the previous, Multi-fibre Agreement, culminating in their
abolition at the end of the UR implementation period. However, China and Taiwan , as
non-members of the WTO, remain constrained by the old, MFA quotas until a date to be
determined in their accession negotiations. Thus their accessions will bring important
changes in the textiles and apparel trade. Since their accessions are likely to involve the
complete elimination of China and Taiwan, China's quotas by 2005 or soon after, it is
likely that these reforms will largely be complete before any cuts under a Millennium
Round are finalized. For this reason, we include their abolition in our baseline analysis as
well.
Trade policies affecting mining products are treated in the same way as
manufacturing (i.e. tariff cuts based on completion of the UR). However, for agriculture
and services, we do not implement any changes from the 1995 base. In the case of
agriculture, 1995 was a year of very high world prices -- and therefore low measured
protection. In contrast, UR commitments were made from a base period from the late
1980's when world prices were very low and measured protection was at an historic high.
In light of these facts -- and in light of the extensive "dirty tariffication" in agriculture
9(Hathaway and Ingco, 1996; Ingco 1996), we believe that the assumption of no change
from 1995 protection in agriculture is sensible.
Structural Changes 1995-2005:  Figure 8 reports the share of manufactures output
destined for exports in 1995 (previously shown in Figure 4) and that implied by our
projections for 2005. Several points are worthy of note. First of all, the export orientation
of manufactures rises over this period in most developing regions -- a fact which is
confirmed in Figure 9. The second point to be taken from Figure 8 is that those regions
undertaking significant policy reforms between 1995 and 2005 also become much more
export-oriented. The most striking case is that of Other South Asia (primarily Bangladesh
and Pakistan), where the combination of deep tariff cuts and removal of the textile and
apparel quotas results in a doubling of the share of manufactures output destined for
export markets. Significant increases also occur in Taiwan and China (WTO accession),
as well as India.
The relatively more rapid growth in developing countries over the projections
period, coupled with relatively deeper cuts in import prices in several large developing
countries, translates into a continuation of the trend towards increased importance of
intra-developing country trade.  This is evident from Figure 2. The trend towards
increased reliance on manufacturing exports also continues. We project that by 2005,
nearly 45% of developing country merchandise exports will be to other developing
countries (Figure 2) and 80% of total developing country merchandise exports will be
manufactures (Figure 1). This further heightens the importance of tariff cuts in the
developing countries under the next Round of negotiations.
IV. Analysis of WTO2000
Description of the Experiment: We focus most our attention in this paper on
analyzing the impact of an across-the-board, 40% cut in post-UR manufacturing tariffs
from our 2005 projection of the world economy. This cut is slightly deeper than the one-
third cuts agreed in agriculture and manufactures trade during the Uruguay Round, and it
is very much in line with some of the proposals being discussed at the time of this
writing. More liberalization, and greater welfare gains, could be achieved by cuts that go
deeper, or which focus more on reducing peak tariffs. The estimates presented in the
paper are intended to provide a benchmark for comparing liberalization in the
manufacturing sector with liberalization in other sectors.
In order to facilitate our analysis of the manufacturing tariff cuts, it is instructive
to carefully examine the level of the post-UR tariffs themselves. Recall that the second
set of bars in Figure 7 report the trade-weighted, average tariffs by importing region.9
From this, we see that manufacturing tariffs in the high-income countries have almost
disappeared. (The one exception was Australia/New Zealand, where average
manufacturing tariffs were estimated at about 7 percent in 1995). These low
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excepting in the case of intra regional trade in NAFTA, the EU, and the EU/EFTA region.
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manufacturing tariffs in the OECD stand in sharp contrast to some of the developing
countries. Despite dramatic reforms in the early 1990’s, and further commitments under
the Uruguay Round, industrial tariffs in India are still expected to be about 35% on a
trade-weighted basis in the year 2005. China’s tariffs were also quite high – nearly 30%
on average in 1995. However, Chinese tariff collections are much lower than this because
of the prevalence of duty exemptions and reductions for investment and export
processing purposes10. China's current WTO offer would bring their trade-weighted
average tariff down to about 20% in 2005.  Manufacturing tariffs in Other South Asia are
projected to come down dramatically by 2005, but they will still average 20%. In sum,
there are still substantial trade gains to be had from manufacturing tariff cuts in the
developing countries, whereas such cuts are expected to have only a modest impact on
the imports of most high-income countries.
In order to ascertain how such cuts would affect the demand for a region’s
exports, it is also instructive to look at the trade-weighted average tariffs, by exporter.
This provides an indication of how much each region is exporting to the more heavily
protected markets. From Figure 10 it is clear that the North America and Western Europe
are not exporting a large share of their manufactures to heavily protected markets. The
trade- weighted average tariff facing them is 4% or less. However, the trade-weighted
average tariff facing most developing countries is much higher. Taiwan and the other
East Asian NICs, Turkey, and India all face average tariffs on their exports of 10% or
more.  This suggests that across-the-board reductions in manufacturing tariffs will
stimulate demand for developing country exports relatively more than it does so for
industrialized countries' manufactures exports.
Results: The 40% cut in manufacturing tariffs, worldwide, generates an increase in
global trade volume of more than $380 billion – or about 4.7% of projected merchandise
and non-factor service trade in 2005. This increase is reflected in almost all products,
including non-manufactures, as shown in Figure 11. The largest increase is for wearing
apparel, where trade volume rises by more than 20%. This politically sensitive sector
remains heavily protected, even in the high-income countries. Textiles and autos follow
in importance.  Clearly, opening up this sector would require use of a “concertina”
approach, such as the Swiss Formula (Laird and Yeats 1987; Brown and Whalley 1980)
that brings down high rates by more than lower tariff rates. Metals, other manufactures
and manufactured petrol-chemical and mineral products experience an increased trade
flow of about 5percent per  year in 2005, following this 40 percent post-UR tariff cut.
When viewed on a regional basis, export volumes rise in almost all regions (Figure
12). The ordering of these regions is quite similar to the ordering of countries in Figure 7.
Those regions that liberalize trade most vigorously, encourage increased imports, thereby
indirectly requiring higher export volumes. India, ROW, China, OthSoAsia, and Brazil
top the list in terms of projected tariff levels in 2005 -- and hence are required to make
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the largest cuts. These countries also experience the largest increase in export volumes
following the liberalization. At the other end of the spectrum, North America, OthNICs
(Singapore and Hong Kong), Japan and Western Europe, show the smallest 2005 tariffs
in Figure 7. Therefore, it is little surprise that these economies also have the smallest
export volume increases in the wake of the 40 percent tariff reduction.
An important feature of the simulation results is a strong expansion in South-South
trade. Whereas North-North  trade falls by 1% percent, and exports from the high income
economies rise by only 2% in the wake of the 40% manufactures tariff cuts, exports from
the developing countries rise by 12% and South-South increases by 11 percent. This
expansion reflects the combination of liberalization in the importing developing
countries, and the improvements in competitiveness and exports that follow the
reductions in countries’ own protection.
The real income impacts of these manufacturing tariff cuts are more complex to
analyze. Welfare gains from such multilateral liberalization are fundamentally
determined by two factors: the change in the efficiency with which any given economy
utilizes its resources, and changes in a country's terms of trade (TOT).  The first bar in
Figure 13 reports the efficiency gains, by region, as a share of 2005 income. These
efficiency gains are closely related to the degree to which a country liberalizes its
markets. Sharp tariff cuts, giving rise to increased access to cheaper imported goods,
generate gains in consumption as well as improvements in the efficiency with which
domestic resources are used.
It is not surprising to see that the largest efficiency gains (as a share of income) are in
the developing economies where tariffs are highest in the 2005 base (second set of bars in
Figure 7). China's gains lead the way, followed by Other South Asia and India. These are
also the regions with the highest initial tariffs. China's greater gains, relative to India
(which is projected to have higher protection levels in 2005), are due to the fact that the
manufacturing sector in China is larger and more trade-oriented in our 2005 projections.
At the far right hand side of Figure 13, we see that the tariff cuts in the industrialized
economies generate almost no efficiency gains, because tariffs are already extremely low
and there is little left to be gained from cuts.
As noted above, there is a second source of welfare gains that can be obtained
through improvements in a country's terms of trade (TOT). Since the effects of TOT
changes are primarily transfers from one region to another, their impacts are essentially  a
zero-sum game. One region's gains are another's loss11. In the case of manufacturing
liberalization, the extent of  a country's TOT gain can be assessed by the extent to which
its welfare gain (second set of bars in Figure 13) exceeds the efficiency gain. This is most
pronounced for Taiwan and the other NICs, followed by Turkey.  What is generating
these strong TOT gains? Return to Figure 10 which shows the average tariff cut facing
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various manufactures exporters. This gives us a first-cut at how much the demand for any
region's exports is likely to increase. The cuts are largest for  Taiwan, Turkey and the
Other NICs. These are also regions for which export volume increases are relatively
modest (Figure 12), thereby translating into a substantial export price hike, relative to
other regions.
Of course, where there are TOT gains, there must also be losses to other regions (i.e.
the second bar in Figure 13 is lower than the first). These show up in those regions
making the deepest tariff cuts: China, India and Other South Asia. In order to pay for
their increased imports, they must export a great deal more of their own products (Figure
12), thereby depressing their export prices and passing some of their efficiency gains on
to importers.
In general, we can see from Figure 13 that the biggest gainers from manufactures cuts
under a WTO2000 Round would be the developing countries, as opposed to the high
income economies. With the exception of Japan, the gains to the latter group are barely
visible in this figure! No wonder there is little interest among the major players in the
WTO negotiations in including manufactures on the agenda. However, the same cannot
be said for the developing countries, where these modest cuts in tariffs protecting about
20% of the productive activity in their combined economies generates a substantial boost
to the annual flow of real income. When measured against value-added in this sector, as
opposed to total expenditure Figure 14 shows that the equivalent variation of these annual
gains are about 14% in the case of China and Other South Asia. India's annual gains are
7% of manufacturing value-added, and they are in the neighborhood of 2 – 4 % for many
of the developing countries. This is a substantial boost to their economies.
What about the overall gains from this 40% cut in manufacturing tariffs? These total
$70 billion in 2005. Since the high income countries dominate global GDP, it is possible
that they still capture a large share of the absolute gains in global welfare following these
tariff cuts.  Figure 15 reports the distribution of welfare gains across regions. More than
80% of the efficiency gains are generated in the developing countries and they capture
nearly three-quarters of these aggregate gains in the form of increased real income. Given
the continued dominance of the high income countries in global manufactures trade, this
figure is quite striking. How does it compare with agriculture and services liberalization?
Comparison with Agriculture and Services Liberalization: Given the emphasis on
agriculture and services trade liberalization in the upcoming round of trade talks, it is of
some interest to compare the distribution of gains from manufacturing tariff cuts to those
offered by comparable relative reductions in agriculture and services protection. Here we
draw on work by Hertel et al. (1999) which estimates the impact of 40% cuts in
agriculture and services protection on global trade and welfare. Those authors place the
total gains from agriculture cuts at $69 billion. The estimated gains from services
liberalization are necessarily tentative, due to the difficulty of estimating patterns of
protection. Hertel et al. draws on the work of Francois (1999) and Hoekman (1995) to
specify these impacts of liberalization. Their best estimate is about $350 billion in gains.
from a 40% liberalization in services trade. From our point of view, the interesting
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question is not the absolute size of these gains, but rather their distribution between
developing and high income regions. From Figure 15, we see that developing countries
capture only one-third of the total gains from services liberalization and less than one-
fourth of the gains from cuts in agricultural protection. In summary, the liberalization
efforts in the built-in agenda yield disproportionate benefits to the high income countries.
Perhaps this helps to explain the much greater interest in agriculture and services
liberalization by the high-income countries in the context of the WTO2000 negotiations.
Of course, these findings are potentially sensitive to some of the assumptions that we
have employed in our analysis.  Of particular relevance are the trade elasticities that we
have employed. Based on the backcasting work of Gehlhar (1997) and Coyle et al.
(1998), we have increased these elasticities beyond their standard medium run values in
the GTAP database.  Specifically, we double them in order to capture the increased
potential for product substitution over the long run (10+ years).  This has the effect of
dampening the terms of trade effects associated with trade liberalization. If instead, we
adopt the smaller trade elasticities – one-half the values used in this paper – the global
welfare gains are also cut in half ($35 billion in total). Furthermore, the distribution of
welfare gains between developing and high income countries is also altered (Figure 16).
Smaller trade elasticites translate into larger terms of trade effects. Since the lion’s share
of the liberalization occurs in the developing countries, their exports increase most (recall
Figure 12) and they have the strongest terms of trade losses.  This dilutes the developing
country share of gains from the 40% manufactures tariff cuts by about 11 percentage
points, from 74% to 63% of the total (Figure 16).
Possible Extensions to the Analysis: This study has taken into account only the direct
implications of liberalization on the static welfare of consumers and producers. Even
these benefits have been underestimated because we have ignored the reductions in the
variability of protection within the broad sectors identified in the model. Bach, Martin
and Stevens (1996) have shown that taking into account the reductions in protection
within sectors can substantially increase the estimated gains from liberalization that
reduces the variation of protection within the broad commodity groups typically used in
model-based analysis.
If negotiators elect to proceed with a formula approach to reducing protection, then
the gains from reductions in the variability of protection may be even larger.  A formula
such as the Swiss formula used in the Tokyo Round negotiations, or any other formula
that brings down high rates more than the low, can be expected to provide greater
benefits than a proportional cut of the type considered in this paper (Brown and Whalley
1980).
Clearly, the assumption of perfect competition throughout the present analysis fails to
take account of the potential for scale economies in many sectors. Incorporating the
interaction between scale economies and liberalization could substantially affect the
estimated benefits from liberalization. In earlier work, we examined the implications of
incorporating monopolistic competition in manufactures. This increased the global
benefits of liberalizing manufactures trade, while reducing somewhat the share of these
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gains accruing to developing countries. One other recent study, by Harrison, Rutherford
and Tarr (1996), found the additional welfare gains from incorporating this factor to be
relatively small. Clearly, more work is needed to satisfactorily resolve this issue.
Another possible extension to the analysis would take into account the potentially
very gains resulting from increases in productivity as countries become more strongly
integrated with the world economy. Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) have recently
emphasized both the importance, and the difficulty, of rigorously establishing this link,
and highlight the importance of ensuring that complementary policy reforms if trade
liberalization is to be associated with higher growth. While they are skeptical of much of
the evidence available in the literature, they do not argue that protection is good for
growth. The link between trade and growth may well be contingent on whether countries
adopt appropriate complementary, development policies to allow them to take advantage
of the opportunities it creates.
V. Summary and Conclusions
The objective of this study was to evaluate the implications of including
manufactures trade liberalization in the WTO 2000 negotiations for the developing
countries. Our approach takes into account the dramatic changes in the pattern of trade
since the lead-up to the Uruguay Round. Furthermore, we have developed projections of
the global economy to the year 2005, when the UR is to be fully implemented. Of
particular note is the sharp increase in the importance of manufactures exports for
developing countries, as well as the increased role for trade between developing
countries.
Examination of the data reveals that most of the countries likely to classify
themselves as “developing” in the WTO 2000 negotiations are heavily dependent on
exports of manufactures. The share of manufactures in developing country exports has
increased almost continuously since the early 1980s, when it was around 30 percent, to
70 percent in 1995. We project this increase to continue, with the share approaching 80%
by 2005. There has also been a rapid increase in trade in manufactures between
developing countries. Close to 40 percent of developing countries exports of
manufactures were directed to other developing countries in 1995, and this is also
projected to increase, to nearly 45%, by the end of the UR implementation period.
Developing country exports of manufactures face much higher trade barriers than
exports from developed countries. Their exports to high income countries face average
tariffs of 3.8 percent, a barrier four times as high as those facing developed country
exports to these markets. The barriers that developing countries face in other developing
countries are even higher at an average of 12.8 percent. Developing country exports were
found to suffer disproportionately from tariffs . Over 40 percent of total tariffs (42% for
manufacturers) were imposed on developing country exports in 1995—as against a GDP
share of 22 percent.
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Quantitative analysis of the implications of liberalizing manufactures trade
reveals that developing countries stand to make substantially larger gains than developed
countries. In fact, we estimate that as much as three-quarters of the gains from
manufacturing sector liberalization could accrue to the developing countries. These
disproportionately large gains to the developing countries reflect a combination of the
greater reductions in export market access that they experience, and the greater efficiency
gains from reducing their own protective barriers. They stand in sharp contrast to
agriculture and services, where the majority of the welfare gains are predicted to accrue
to developed countries.
Overall, the results of this study suggest that it is very important for developing
countries to ensure that liberalization of developing country trade is included in the
agenda for the WTO 2000 negotiations. The gains to developing countries are relatively
large, and broadly based. They also appear to be robust to assumptions about the extent
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Table 1. Trade Balances: 1995 (FOB exports - CIF imports)
Agric Minerals Mnfcs Svces Total
Developing 2306 133633 -221289 71237 -14112
HighIncome -33434 -159297 49822 157021 14112
Total -31129 -25664 -171466 228258 0
Note: Sectoral trade balances don't sum to zero due to international transport service margins
Source: GTAP Version 4 database, McDougall et al., 1999
Table 2. Destinations for  Manufactures Trade, 1995
Industrial Developing Total
Industrial 70.2 29.8 100
Developing 60.4 39.6 100
Total 67.4 32.6 100
Source: GTAP Version 4 database, McDougall et al., 1999.
Table 3. Tariffs on merchandise trade, by commodity, source and destination, 1995
Importing Region
Exporting region High Income Developing World
Manufactures % % %
High Income 0.8 10.9 3.8
Developing 3.4 12.8 7.1
World 1.5 11.5 4.7
Agriculture
High Income 15.9 21.5 17.5
Developing 15.1 18.3 16.4
World 15.6 20.1 17.1
Minerals/Energy
High Income 0.1 1.3 0.4
Developing 0.4 5.2 2.4
World 0.2 3.0 1.1
Source: GTAP 4  Database, McDougall, et al.,  1999.
3Table 4. Implied tariff collections, by commodity, source and destination, 1995
Destination Region
Supplying region High Income Developing World
Manufactures $bn $bn $bn
High Income 16 93 109
Developing 23 57 80
World 40 150 190
Agriculture
High Income 37 20 57
Developing 16 14 30
World 53 34 87
Minerals/Energy
High Income 0.2 1.2 1.4
Developing 0.5 3.9 4.4
World 0.7 5 5.8
All Merchandise
High Income 54 114 167
Developing 40 75 115
World 94 189 282
Source: GTAP 4  Database, McDougall et al. (1999).
4Table 5. The cost structure of the manufacturing sectors of High Income and Developing
countries (import shares of total costs in parentheses)


























Source: GTAP 4  Database, McDougall et al. (1999).
5Table 6. The structure of private household consumption in High Income and Developing

























Source: GTAP 4  Database, McDougall et al. (1999).












11 14 39 39 low
(1.05) (1.29) (3.33) (3.33)
Western Europe
(WEurope)
1 0 29 9 high
(0.10) (0.03) (2.60) (0.83)
Australia/New Zealand
(AusNZl)
10 11 66 20 low
(0.97) (1.09) (5.20) (1.84)
Japan 2 -3 32 4 low
(0.20) (-0.29) (2.83) (0.37)
China 9 12 43 139 very high
(0.83) (1.17) (3.66) (9.08)
Taiwan 8 13 51 56 very high
(0.73) (1.21) (4.18) (4.52)
Other NICs
(OthNICs)
9 8 66 23 high
(0.84) (0.73) (5.18) (2.09)
Indonesia 14 21 126 20 low
(1.31) (1.96) (8.47) (1.82)
Other Southeast Asia
(OthSEA)
19 26 84 33 low
(1.73) (2.36) (6.29) (2.87)
India 17 23 73 116 medium
(1.59) (2.11) (5.65) (8.01)
Other South Asia
(OthSoAsia)
23 33 77 40 medium
(2.10) (2.92) (5.87) (3.39)
Brazil 13 22 70 -7 high
(1.26) (2.04) (5.46) (-0.69)
Other Latin America
(OthLatAm)
18 23 89 27 medium
(1.63) (2.11) (6.55) (2.41)
Turkey 15 22 104 35 high
(1.44) (2.02) (7.41) (3.06)
Other Middle East & North Africa
(OthMENA)
27 37 109 11 low
(2.43) (3.17) (7.64) (1.07)
Economies in Transition
(EIT)
3 6 69 36 low
(0.27) (0.60) (5.37) (3.09)
South Africa Customs Union
(SoAfrCU)
23 29 162 -1 low
(2.06) (2.59) (10.11) (-0.10)
Other Sub-Saharan Africa
(OthSSA)
33 37 88 25 medium
(2.87) (3.19) (6.50) (2.23)
Rest of World
(ROW)
18 21 83 50 medium
(1.65) (1.90) (6.22) (4.15)
* The low, medium, high, and very high growth assumptions for total factor productivity (TFP) in manufacturing correspond
to annual growth rates of 0.3%, 1%, 2%, and 3%, respectively. TFP growth in other sectors is based on a proportion of this
rate. These proportions are: 1.4 (agriculture), 0.5 (services) and 0.0 (mining).
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8 Appendix Tables:
Appendix Table A1. List of regions included in developing country aggregate
NAmerica     & North America
WEurope      & Western Europe
AusNZL       & Australia-New Zealand
Japan        & Japan
China        & China
Taiwan       & Taiwan
OthNICs      & Other NICs
Indonesia    & Indonesia
OthSEA       & Other Southeast Asia
India        & India
OthSoAsia    & Other South Asia
Brazil       & Brazil
OthLatAm     & Other Latin America
Turkey       & Turkey
OthMENA      & Other M East and N Africa
EIT          & Economies in Transition
SoAfrCU      & South Africa Customs Union
OthSSA       & Other Sub-saharan Africa
ROW          & All other regions
9Table A2. Mapping from GTAP version 4 regions to the 28 regional groupings used for the
analysis
aus            Australia                       & AusNZL
nzl            New Zealand                     & AusNZL
jpn            Japan                           & Japan
kor            Korea                           & OthNICs
idn            Indonesia                       & Indonesia
mys            Malaysia                        & OthSEA
phl            Philippines                     & OthSEA
sgp            Singapore                       & OthNICs
tha            Thailand                        & OthSEA
vnm            Viet Nam                        & OthSEA
chn            China                           & China
hkg            Hong Kong                       & OthNICs
twn            Taiwan                          & Taiwan
ind            India                           & India
lka            Sri Lanka                       & OthSoAsia
ras            Rest of South Asia              & OthSoAsia
can            Canada                          & NAmerica
usa            United States of America        & NAmerica
mex            Mexico                          & NAmerica
cam            Central America and Caribbean   & OthLatAm
ven            Venezuela                       & OthLatAm
col            Colombia                        & OthLatAm
rap            Rest of the Andean Pact         & OthLatAm
arg            Argentina                       & OthLatAm
bra            Brazil                          & Brazil
chl            Chile                           & OthLatAm
ury            Uruguay                         & OthLatAm
rsm            Rest of South America           & OthLatAm
gbr            United Kingdom                  & WEurope
deu            Germany                         & WEurope
dnk            Denmark                         & WEurope
swe            Sweden                          & WEurope
fin            Finland                         & WEurope
reu            Rest of European Union          & WEurope
eft            EFTA                            & WEurope
cea            Central European Associates     & EIT
fsu            Former Soviet Union             & EIT
tur            Turkey                          & Turkey
rme            Rest of Middle East             & OthMENA
mar            Morocco                         & OthMENA
rnf            Rest of North Africa            & OthMENA
saf            South African Customs Union     & SoAfrCU
rsa            Rest of southern Africa         & OthSSA
rss            Rest of sub-Saharan Africa      & OthSSA
row            Rest of World                   & ROW
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Table A3. Descriptions of 19 Sectors used in the Analysis
foodgrains   & rice, wheat, coarse grains and
feedgrains   & coarse grains
oilseeds     & oilseeds
meatlstk     & ruminants and non-ruminants an
dairy        & dairy
othagr       & other farm products
othfood      & other processed foods
bevtobac     & beverages and tobacco
extract      & mining, fish, forestry
textiles     & textiles
wearapp      & wearing apparel
woodpaper    & wood and paper products
pchemineral  & petcoal, crp, nmm
metals       & metals and metal products
autos        & motor vehicles and parts
electronics  & electronic equipment
othmnfcs     & oth trans equipment, mach and
houseutils   & housing and utilities
tradetrans   & trade and transport services
construction & construction services
busfinance   & business and financial service
govservice   & government services
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Table A4. Detailed mapping of sectors into four aggregate categories (extracted from the
GTAP, version 4 mapping file)
pdr            Paddy rice                      & foodgrains
wht            Wheat                           & foodgrains
gro            Cereal grains nec               & feedgrains
v_f            Vegetables, fruit, nuts         & othagr
osd            Oil seeds                       & oilseeds
c_b            Sugar cane, sugar beet          & othagr
pfb            Plant-based fibers              & othagr
ocr            Crops nec                       & othagr
ctl            Bovine cattle, sheep and goats  & meatlstk
oap            Animal products nec             & meatlstk
rmk            Raw milk                        & dairy
wol            Wool silk-worm cocoons          & meatlstk
for            Forestry                        & extract
fsh            Fishing                         & extract
col            Coal                            & extract
oil            Oil                             & extract
gas            Gas                             & extract
omn            Minerals nec                    & extract
cmt            Bovine cattle, sheep and goat,  & meatlstk
omt            Meat products nec               & meatlstk
vol            Vegetable oils and fats         & othfood
mil            Dairy products                  & dairy
pcr            Processed rice                  & foodgrains
sgr            Sugar                           & othfood
ofd            Food products nec               & othfood
b_t            Beverages and tobacco products  & bevtobac
tex            Textiles                        & textiles
wap            Wearing apparel                 & wearapp
lea            Leather products                & othmnfcs
lum            Wood products                   & woodpaper
ppp            Paper products, publishing      & woodpaper
p_c            Petroleum, coal products        & pchemineral
crp            Chemical, rubber, plastic prod  & pchemineral
nmm            Mineral products nec            & pchemineral
i_s            Ferrous metals                  & metals
nfm            Metals nec                      & metals
fmp            Metal products                  & metals
mvh            Motor vehicles and parts        & autos
otn            Transport equipment nec         & othmnfcs
ele            Electronic equipment            & electronics
ome            Machinery and equipment nec     & othmnfcs
omf            Manufactures nec                & othmnfcs
ely            Electricity                     & houseutils
gdt            Gas manufacture, distribution   & houseutils
wtr            Water                           & houseutils
cns            Construction                    & construction
t_t            Trade, transport                & tradetrans
osp            Financial, business, recreatio  & busfinance
osg            Public admin and defence, educ  & govservice
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dwe            Dwellings                       & houseutils
